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Abstract
Concerns have reached the mainstream about how social me-
dia are affecting political outcomes. One trajectory for this is
the exposure of politicians to online abuse. In this paper we
use 1.4 million tweets from the months before the 2015 and
2017 UK general elections to explore the abuse directed at
politicians. This collection allows us to look at abuse broken
down by both party and gender and aimed at specific Mem-
bers of Parliament. It also allows us to investigate the charac-
teristics of those who send abuse and their topics of interest.
Results show that in both absolute and proportional terms,
abuse increased substantially in 2017 compared with 2015.
Abusive replies are somewhat less directed at women and
those not in the currently governing party. Those who send
the abuse may be issue-focused, or they may repeatedly target
an individual. In the latter category, accounts are more likely
to be throwaway. Those sending abuse have a wide range of
topical triggers, including borders and terrorism.
Introduction
The recent UK EU referendum and the US presidential elec-
tion, among other recent political events, have drawn atten-
tion to the increasing power of social media usage to influ-
ence major international outcomes. Such media profoundly
affect our society, in ways which are yet to be fully un-
derstood. One particularly unsavoury way in which peo-
ple attempt to influence each other is through verbal abuse
and intimidation. In response to this concern, the UK gov-
ernment has recently announced a review looking at how
abuse and intimidation affect Parliamentary candidates dur-
ing elections.1 Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott has
taken a key role in drawing attention to the phenomenon and
speaking out about how it affects her and her colleagues.23
There is a broad perception that intolerance, for exam-
ple religious or racial, is on the increase in recent years,
1https://www.gov.uk/government/news/review-into-abuse-and-
intimidation-in-elections
2https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/12/pm-orders-
inquiry-into-intimidation-experienced-by-mps-during-election
3https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/19/diane-
abbott-on-abuse-of-mps-staff-try-not-to-let-me-walk-around-
alone
some associating this with the election of Donald Trump.45
In the UK, the outcome of the EU membership referendum,
in which the British public chose to leave the EU, was also
associated with the legitimisation of racist attitudes and an
ensuing increased expression of those attitudes.6 Twitter is a
barometer as well as mediator of these mindsets, providing a
forum where users can communicate their message to public
figures with relatively little personal consequence.
In this work we focus on abusive replies to tweets by
UK politicians in the run-up to the 2015 and 2017 UK gen-
eral elections. The analysis focuses on tweets using obscene
nouns (“cunt”, “twat”, etc), racist or otherwise bigoted lan-
guage, milder insults (“you idiot”, “coward”) and words that
can be threats (“kill”, “rape”). In this way, we define “abuse”
broadly; “hate speech”, where religious, racial or gender
groups are denigrated, would be included in this, but we do
not limit our analysis to hate speech. We include all manner
of personal attacks and threats. Obscene language more gen-
erally (e.g. “fucking”, “bloody”) was not counted as abusive
as it was less likely to be targeted at the politician personally.
These data allowed us to explore the following questions:
• What influences the amount of abuse a politician re-
ceives?
• What can we learn about those who send abuse?
• What are the topics of concern to those who send abuse?
• What difference do we see in the above between the two
time periods studied?
The work presented is part of a new and under-researched
field looking at how abuse and intimidation are directed at
our political representatives online. As politicians increas-
ingly talk about their reluctance to expose themselves to this
abuse and intimidation7, we see that there is a very real dan-
ger that they may no longer choose to do this work, and the
4https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hate-on-the-
rise-after-trumps-election
5https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/ae-
elliott/assemble-ye-trolls-rise-of-online-hate-speech
6https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/27/brexit-
racism-eu-referendum-racist-incidents-politicians-media
7https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/18/vile-
online-abuse-against-women-mps-needs-to-be-challenged-now
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part they play in creating a fair representation of the elec-
torate will be lost. For this reason, it is important to engage
with this aspect of the way the web is affecting our soci-
ety. Previous work has examined abusive behaviour online
towards different groups, but the reasons why a politician
might inspire an uncivil response are very different to an
ordinary member of the public, with resulting different im-
plications. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study to contrast quantitative changes across two
comparable but temporally distinct samples (the two general
election periods).
Related Work
Whilst online fora have attracted much attention as a way of
exploring political dynamics (Nulty et al. 2016; Kaczmirek
et al. 2013; Colleoni, Rozza, and Arvidsson 2014; We-
ber, Garimella, and Borra 2012; Conover et al. 2011;
Gonzalez-Bailon, Banchs, and Kaltenbrunner 2010), and the
effect of abuse and incivility in these contexts has been ex-
plored (Vargo and Hopp 2017; Ru¨sel 2017; Gervais 2015;
Hwang et al. 2008), little work exists regarding the abu-
sive and intimidating ways people address politicians on-
line; a trend that has worrying implications for democracy.
Theocharis et al (2016) collected tweets centred around can-
didates for the European Parliament election in 2014 from
Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom and France posted
in the month surrounding the election. They find that the
extent of the abuse and harrassment a politician is sub-
ject to correlates with their engagement with the medium.
Their analysis focuses on the way in which uncivil be-
haviour negatively impacts on the potential of the medium
to increase interactivity and positively stimulate democ-
racy. Stambolieva (2017) studies online abuse against female
Members of Parliament (MPs) only; in studying male MPs
as well, we are able to contrast the level of abuse they each
receive. Furthermore, we contrast proportional with abso-
lute figures, creating quite a different impression from the
one she gives.
A larger body of work has looked at hatred on social
media more generally (Bartlett et al. 2017; Perry and Ols-
son 2009; Coe, Kenski, and Rains 2014; Cheng, Danescu-
Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2015). Williams and Burnap
present work demonstrating the potential of Twitter for ev-
idencing social models of online hate crime that could sup-
port prediction, as well as exploring how attitudes co-evolve
with events to determine their impact (Williams and Burnap
2015; Burnap and Williams 2015). Silva et al (2016) use nat-
ural language processing (NLP) to identify the groups tar-
geted for hatred on Twitter and Whisper.
Work exists regarding accurately identifying abusive mes-
sages automatically (Burnap and Williams 2015; Nobata et
al. 2016; Chen et al. 2012; Dinakar et al. 2012; Wulczyn,
Thain, and Dixon 2017). The work of Wulczyn et al has
been described as the state of the art, with precision/recall
of 0.63 being reported as equivalent to human performance.
Bartlett et al (2017) report a human interannotator agree-
ment of only 0.69 in annotating racial slurs, and Theocharis
et al (2016) report a human agreement of 0.8 with a Krip-
pendorf’s alpha of 0.25 on UK data, demonstrating that the
#collected #hadabuse %abusive
2015 MPs+cands 597 411 16 628 2.8%
2015 MPs 277 000 10 091 3.6%
2017 MPs+cands 821 662 32 791 4%
2017 MPs 613 952 24 659 4%
Table 1: Corpus statistics
limiting factor is the complexity of the task definition. Bur-
nap and Williams (2016) particularly focus on hate speech
with regards to protected characteristics such as race, dis-
ability and sexual orientation. Waseem and Hovy (2016) also
focus on hate speech, and share a gold standard UK Tweet
corpus. Dadvar et al (2013) seek to identify the problem ac-
counts rather than the problem material. Schmidt and Wie-
gand (2017) provide a review of prior work and methods.
In the next section, we describe our data collection
methodology. We then present our results, beginning with
an analysis of who receives the abuse, before moving on to
who sends it and the topics that are most likely to trigger
abusive replies.
Data Collection
The 2015 corpus was created by downloading tweets in real-
time using Twitter’s streaming API. Tweets posted from the
end of May 6th to the end of June 6th (the day before
the election) were collected. The data collection focused on
Twitter accounts of MPs, candidates, and official party ac-
counts. We obtained a list of all current MPs8 and all cur-
rently known election candidates9 (at that time) who had
Twitter accounts (506 currently elected MPs and 1811 candi-
dates, of whom 444 MPs were also standing for re-election).
We collected every tweet by each of these users, and every
retweet and reply (by anyone) for the month leading up to
the 2015 general election. The methodology was the same
for the 2017 collection, this time collecting from the end of
April 7th to the end of May 7th, for 1952 candidates and
480 sitting MPs, of whom 417 were also candidates. Data
were of a low enough volume not to be constrained by Twit-
ter rate limits. Corpus statistics are given in table 1, and are
separated out into all politicians studied and just those who
were then elected as MPs.
In order to identify abusive language, the politicians it is
targeted at, and the topics in the politician’s original tweet
that tend to trigger abusive replies, we use a set of NLP
tools, combined into a semantic analysis pipeline. It in-
cludes, among other things, a component for MP and candi-
date recognition, which detects mentions of MPs and elec-
tion candidates in the tweet and pulls in information about
them from DBpedia. Topic detection finds mentions in the
text of political topics (e.g. environment, immigration) and
subtopics (e.g. fossil fuels). The list of topics was derived
from the set of topics used to categorise documents on the
8From a list made publicly available by BBC News Labs, which
we cleaned and verified
9List of candidates obtained from https://yournextmp.com
gov.uk website10, first seeded manually and then extended
semi-automatically to include related terms and morpholog-
ical variants using TermRaider11, resulting in a total of 940
terms across 51 topics. We also perform hashtag tokeniza-
tion, in order to find abuse and threat terms that otherwise
would be missed. In this way, for example, abusive language
is found in the hashtag “#killthewitch”.
A dictionary-based approach was used to detect abusive
language in tweets. An abusive tweet is considered to be one
containing one or more abusive terms from the vocabulary
list.12 This contained 404 abuse terms in British and Amer-
ican English, comprising mostly an extensive collection of
insults, with a few threat terms such as “kill” and “die” also
included. Racist and homophobic terms are included as well
as various terms that denigrate a person’s appearance or in-
telligence.
Data from Kaggle’s 2012 challenge, “Detecting Insults in
Social Commentary”13, was used to evaluate the success of
the approach, comprising two similar corpora of short online
comments marked as either abusive or not abusive, amount-
ing to around 6000 items. Our approach was shown to have
an accuracy of 0.78 (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.39) on the first set,
with a precision of 0.62, a recall of 0.45 and an F1 0.53; and
0.78 on the second (Cohen’s Kappa: 0.36), a precision of
0.60, recall of 0.43 nad F1 of 0.50. In practice, performance
is likely to be slightly better than this, since the Kaggle cor-
pus is American English. This performance is comparable
to that obtained by Stambolieva (2017), though somewhat
lower than the state of the art, where F1s in excess of 0.6
have been reported on longer texts (see the previous sec-
tion). Given the noisy and brief nature of tweets, however, it
is often the case that deeper semantic analysis methods, e.g.
dependency parsing, tend to perform poorly, which is why
we opted for a robust dictionary-based approach. Manual re-
view of the errors shows that some false positives arise in the
area of threat terms, such as “rape” and “murder”, which
are often discussed as being topics of concern, and there
are also a small number of cases where strong language is
used simply for emphasis or even meant positively, as in one
case where a politician was praised for “working his balls
off” and encouraged to “get his arse into Downing Street”.
(Downing Street is the location of the UK government head-
quarters.) The errors do not seem to show any particular bias
that might affect the results reported here.
Who is receiving the abuse?
One claim made by politicians from all parties is that the
amount of abuse, in terms of both volume and proportion,
has increased in recent years. With our dataset spanning
both the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections, we have the
opportunity to contribute some evidence on this point. Fig-
ure 1 shows both the proportion of replies which are abu-
sive (the heights of the bars) for 2015 (grey bars) and 2017
10e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/policies
11https://gate.ac.uk/projects/arcomem/TermRaider.html
12see supplementary materials for anonymous review
13https://www.kaggle.com/c/detecting-insults-in-social-
commentary/data
(bars coloured by party), and the change in volume of abu-
sive replies (the width of the bars). The graph shows that
in most cases, regardless of party or gender (note that only
party/gender combinations which are relevant to both 2015
and 2017 are shown), both the proportion and volume have
increased between 2015 and 2017. The two exceptions are
where the proportion of abusive replies has fallen for male
Labour Party MPs, and where the volume of abusive replies
has fallen for male Scottish National Party (SNP) MPs. The
former is difficult to explain, whereas the latter can be eas-
ily attributed to the loss of seats (the party as a whole went
from winning 56 seats in 2015 to winning just 35 in 2017).
In most cases, however, it is clear that both the proportion
and volume of abusive replies have risen in the two years be-
tween elections. In some cases this rise has been dramatic,
noticeably for female Conservative MPs, although there are
clear reasons (Theresa May becoming Prime Minister in this
case) behind most of the dramatic changes. However, these
are better investigated through other analyses and visualiza-
tions.
In figures 2 and 3, also available online in interactive
form14, the outer ring represents MPs, and the size of each
outer segment is determined by the number of abusive
replies each receives. Working inwards you can then see the
MP’s gender (pink for female and blue for male) and party
affiliation (blue for Conservative, red for Labour, yellow for
the Scottish National Party – see the interactive graph to ex-
plore the smaller parties). The darkness of each MP segment
denotes the percentage of the replies they receive which
are abusive. This ranges from white, which represents up
to 1%, through to black, which represents 8% and above.
It is clear that some MPs receive substantially more abu-
sive replies than others. These visualizations highlight that
prominence seems to be a bigger indicator of the quantity of
abusive replies an MP receives than party or gender. In 2015
the majority of the abusive replies were sent to the lead-
ers of the two main political parties (David Cameron and
Ed Miliband). In 2017 the people receiving the most abuse
has changed, but again the leaders of the two main parties
(Jeremy Corbyn and Theresa May) receive a large propor-
tion of the abuse, followed by other prominent members of
the two parties. Unlike in 2015 though, in 2017 there are
other MPs who receive a large proportion of the abuse; most
notably Boris Johnson, who rose to national prominence as
one of the main proponents of the Leave campaign during
the UK European Union membership referendum and with
his subsequent promotion to Foreign Secretary. Conversely,
Ed Miliband has seen the volume of abuse he receives re-
duce dramatically with his return to the back benches after
quitting as leader of the Labour Party after the 2015 election.
Whilst this view is useful in understanding the amount of
abuse politicians receive in absolute terms, it is less valu-
able in illustrating the different responses the parties and
genders receive, because individual effects dominate the pic-
ture. Therefore it is important to also see the results per-MP.
The online version of these graphs includes a “count” view
in which each segment of the outer ring represents a single
14http://greenwoodma.servehttp.com/data/buzzfeed/sunburst.html
Figure 1: Rise in abuse from 2015 (grey bars) to 2017
Figure 2: Abuse per MP in 2015
MP. It is evident at a glance that replies to male Conservative
MPs are proportionally more abusive, with female Conser-
vative MPs not far behind, an impression that will be further
explored statistically below.
Structural equation modeling (see Hox and
Bechger (2007) for an introduction) was used to broadly
relate three main factors with the amount of abuse received:
prominence, Twitter prominence (which we hypothesise
differs from prominence generally) and Twitter engagement.
We obtained Google Trends data for the 50 most abused
politicians in each of the time periods, and used this variable
as a measure of how high-profile that individual is in the
minds of the public at the time in question. Search counts
for the month running up to each election were totalled
to provide a figure. We used number of tweets sent by
that politician as a measure of their Twitter engagement,
and tweets received as a measure of how high-profile that
Figure 3: Abuse per MP in 2017
person is on Twitter. The model in figure 4, in addition to
proposing that the amount of abuse received follows from
these three main factors, also hypothesises that the amount
of attention a person receives on Twitter is related to their
prominence more generally, and that their engagement with
Twitter might get them more attention, both on Twitter
and beyond it. It is unavoidably only a partial attempt to
describe why a person receives the abuse they do, since it
is hard to capture factors specific to that person, such as
any recent allegations concerning them, in a measure. The
model was fitted using Lavaan,15 resulting in a chi-square
with a p-value of 0.403 (considered satisfactory, see Hox
and Bechger (2007)), and shows a number of significant
findings (indicated with a bold line and asterisks against
the regression figure). A strong pathway to receiving more
15http://lavaan.ugent.be/
Figure 4: Abuse per MP in 2017
abuse on Twitter is simply that if a person is well-known,
they receive a lot of tweets, and if they receive a lot of
tweets, they receive a lot of abusive tweets, in absolute
terms. However, an additional pathway shows that having
removed this numbers effect from consideration, being very
well known (if Google searches can be taken as a measure
of that) leads to a person being less likely to receive abuse
on Twitter. Perhaps to certain senders of abuse, a large
target is a less attractive one. A further pathway positively
relates Twitter engagement to abuse received, supporting
Theocharis et al’s (2016) findings. In this case, perhaps it
is what the person said that provides an attractive target for
abuse. The suggestion is that there may be different types of
abuse going on.
The effects that aren’t significant are also interesting. For
example, engaging more with Twitter doesn’t correlate with
getting more attention on Twitter. The impact of gender,
party and ethnicity is, though somewhat telling, uncom-
pelling in this model, so these are explored separately. In the
model, being female and being a Labour politician emerge
as factors tending to reduce abuse received, relative to being
a male or a Conservative; being a member of any other party
even more so. Being an ethnic minority may tend to increase
it. Note however that the ethnicity data is sparse, so unlikely
to reveal a significant result.
In the full set of 2017 politicians, male MPs received
around 2 abusive tweets in every 100 responses (σ = .0261),
compared with women MPs’ 1.3 (σ = .0139). (Note that
these numbers appear low compared with the overall corpus
statistics because of the long tail of MPs with little abuse.)
An independent samples t-test finds the difference signifi-
cant (p<.001). In order to test the possibility that the ef-
fect arises from a small number of dominant individuals,
we removed those politicians receiving in excess of 10,000
tweets in the sample period, namely Angela Rayner, Boris
Johnson, Diane Abbott, Jeremy Hunt, Jeremy Corbyn, Tim
Farron and Theresa May. The difference remains significant
(p<.01) even after the removal of these outliers. This result
is also found in the 2015 data (p<.05), remaining significant
though weaker even after the removal of, in the case of 2015,
three male outliers; David Cameron, Ed Milliband and Nick
Clegg. In 2015, as discussed above, the level of abuse was
lower, with men receiving around 1.3 abusive tweets in every
100 (σ = .0131) to women’s 1 (σ = .0105). Black, Asian
and ethnic minority (BAME) MPs received marginally less
abuse than non-BAME MPs in the 2017 sample (1.4% as
opposed to 1.7%; data not available for 2015), but the result
was not significant, and contradicts the finding above, sug-
gesting that other factors may account for it. Recall also that
the BAME sample size is small.
Differences in the proportion of abusive tweets received
across parties are also apparent. In an independent samples
t-test, Conservative MPs received significantly more abusive
tweets than Labour (p<.001) in the time frame studied, with
an average of 2.3 percent (σ = .0286) as opposed to 1.3 per-
cent (σ = .0135). This result is unaltered by the removal of
the above outliers; Conservatives received 2.2 abusive tweets
per hundred as opposed to 1.2 by Labour MPs, and the sig-
nificance of the result remains the same. Conservatives also
receive more abuse in 2015; however, in 2015 the result is
not significant, perhaps suggesting a greater dependence on
the prevailing political circumstances. It would certainly be
interesting to review whether this result changes should the
Conservatives stop being the governing party.
Who is sending the abuse?
Having established which politicians tend to be targeted by
abusive messages, now let us examine the accounts behind
these posts. For this analysis we focused on the 2506 Twitter
accounts in our 2017 dataset who have sent at least three
abuse-containing tweets. A random sample of 2500 tweeters
for whom we found no abusive tweets were then selected to
form a contrast group.
Independent samples t-tests revealed that those who
tweeted abusively have more recent Twitter accounts by
a few months (1533 days on average vs 1608, p<.001),
smaller numbers of favourited tweets (7379 vs 14596,
p<.001), fewer followers (1085 vs 3260, p<.05), follow
fewer accounts (923 vs 1472, p<.05), are featured in fewer
lists (23 vs 67, p<.001) and have fewer posts (16445 vs
25258, p<.001). After partialing out account age, number
of abusive tweets still correlated significantly with num-
ber of favourites (p<.001), number of followed accounts
(p<.001), number of times listed (p<.01) and number of
posts (p<.001), demonstrating that with the exception of
follower number, these relationships cannot be explained by
account age. One explanation for these findings would be
that a certain number of accounts are being created for the
purpose of sending anonymous abuse.
To investigate in more detail the abuse-sending behaviour
of these 2,506 accounts, we define a new metric, “target-
edness”, in order to differentiate between those users who
send strongly worded tweets to a wide number of politicians
(perhaps because their strength of feeling pertains to an is-
sue rather than a particular person to whom they tweet) and
those users that target a particular individual or a small num-
ber of politicians. The metric t is given in equation 1. It di-
vides the total number of abuse-containing tweets found in
our sample authored by that Twitter user, a, by the number
of separate recipients to whom they were directed, r. Multi-
plying the divisor by two and subtracting one (a conservative
choice that yet achieves the objective) provides a simple way
to deflate the score for those with more recipients, compared
with those achieving the same ratio with a smaller number
of tweets to a smaller number of people. In this way, for ex-
ample, sending five abuse-containing tweets to five different
politicians results in a lower targetedness score than send-
ing one abuse-containing tweet to one politician. The metric
has the advantage (compared with for example Gini coeffi-
cient or entropy) of appropriately positioning the “long tail”
of accounts with little abuse in the middle ground.
t =
a
(2 ∗ r)− 1) (1)
This metric was used to split the group into three parts:
those with a score higher than one (n = 708), whose abuse
pattern we refer to as “targeted”; those with a score lower
than one (n = 646), described below as “broad”; and those
scoring one (n = 1021), which we dub “responsive”. These
three groups show distinct behavioural patterns. For exam-
ple, those that target one or two individuals for repeated abu-
sive tweets (“targeted”) include one Twitter user who ad-
dressed Jeremy Hunt with a single word epithet 28 times in
our sample, and one account, now deleted, who made MP
James Heappey the focus of their exclusive uncivil attention
to the tune of 34 tweets. James Heappey made an unpopu-
lar comment to a schoolchild shortly before the 2017 gen-
eral election, which might have been a contributing factor in
the attention he received. Those that send a large number of
abuse-containing tweets thinly spread among a large num-
ber of politicians (“broad”) tend to be ideologically driven;
for example, one user addresses ten different individuals and
focuses consistently on class war.
Both targeted and broad users show indicators that differ-
entiate them to a greater extent from tweeters who were not
found to have sent any abusive tweets; namely, the former
have fewer posts, fewer favourites, newer accounts, fewer
followers and fewer followees, as well as appearing on fewer
lists, with the “targeted“ group more pronounced in these ef-
fects than the “broad” group. There are also abuse-sending
tweeters in the middle ground – the “responsive”. These ad-
dress a medium number of people with a medium amount
of abuse and have account statistics that are closer to normal
(though note that the inclusion of the long tail of accounts
with little abuse in the “responsive” category may contribute
to this). Figures 5, 6 and 7 illustrate these findings, showing
average account age, average number of followed accounts,
Figure 5: Av. Account Ages (Days)
Figure 6: Av. Following/Followers
average number of followers and average number of posts
respectively.
Only in the group showing targeted abuse behaviour do
we see a significant difference in account age compared
with the control group (1448 days on av. vs 1606 with a
higher standard deviation; 1208 days vs 1023, p<.001). The
other two types of abuse profile do not show a significant
effect with account age, perhaps indicating that throwaway
accounts are more likely to be occurring in the former group.
All other indicators for all abuse types remain significantly
different from the control group for whom no abuse was
found, other than follower number.
In order to establish that number of abusive tweets alone
does not explain the effect, a sample was selected of tweeters
with 3 to 9 abusive tweets inclusive. This resulted in a lower
average number of abusive tweets from the “targeted” group
(n = 519) compared with the “broad” group (n = 674).
Even within this sample, the “targeted” group had substan-
tially younger Twitter accounts, fewer favourites, fewer fol-
lowers, followed fewer accounts, were listed less often and
had posted less.
In Figure 8 we plot the account age in years against the
percentage of accounts from each category with that age, al-
lowing us to explore the differences in account age between
the different abuse types in more detail. Amongst all 8 to
Figure 7: Average Number of Posts
10 year old accounts, those inclined to send abuse were cre-
ated later compared with those that did not. In other words,
the oldest of all non-abuse accounts are a little older than
the oldest of the accounts that send abuse. Secondly, in the
most recent 1.5 years, many Twitter accounts have been cre-
ated, including a prominent spike even for the control group.
This indicates a fairly high rate of account creation, but this
effect is more pronounced for those that send abuse, partic-
ularly targeted abuse, perhaps suggesting that the intention
to abuse is a prominent reason, though not the only one, for
creating a throwaway account.
A similar analysis of accounts that sent abusive tweets in
the leadup to the 2015 general election revealed some differ-
ences compared with 2017. Firstly, whilst abuse-posting ac-
counts were again younger, in 2015 they posted more (12732
statuses on average vs 8752, p<.001) and favourited more
(2499 vs 1517, p<.001). Reviewing the data reveals that in
2015 more abuse was sent by a smaller number of individu-
als, including a substantial number of what might be termed
serial offenders, who perhaps explicitly seek attention by
posting and favouriting. The greater quantity of abuse found
in the 2017 data is more thinly spread across a larger num-
ber of lesser offenders. Twitter’s commitment to reviewing
and potentially blocking abusive users might account for the
difference in the two years. It is striking that despite evi-
dent progress in that regard, the amount of abuse has still
increased. Manual review of the data shows no evidence
of “bots” (automated accounts) in the sample. Though bot
activity is common in Twitter political contexts (Kollanyi,
Howard, and Woolley 2016), we suggest that bots are un-
likely to use abusive language.
In both the 2015 dataset and the 2017 one we found that
significantly more accounts had been closed from the group
that sent abusive tweets; 16% rather than 6% (p<.01) in
2015 and 8% rather than 2% (p<.001) in 2017 (Fisher’s ex-
act test).
Topics Triggering Abusive Replies
To explore what motivates people to send abusive tweets, we
begin by analysing what topics are mentioned by them in
their abusive responses to candidates. Abusive tweets were
compared against the set of predetermined topics described
earlier. Words relating to these topics were then used to de-
termine the level of interest in these topics among the abu-
sive tweets, in order to gain an idea of what the abusive
tweeters were concerned about. So for example, the follow-
ing 2017 tweet is counted as one for “borders and immigra-
tion” and one for “schools”: “Mass immigration is ruining
schools, you dick. We can’t afford the interpretation bill.”
The topic titles shown in figures 9, 10, 11, 12 are gener-
ally self-explanatory, but a few require clarification. “Com-
munity and society” refers to issues pertaining to minori-
ties and inclusion, and includes religious groups and dif-
ferent sexual identities. “Democracy” includes references to
the workings of political power, such as “eurocrats”. “Na-
tional security” mainly refers to terrorism, where “crime and
policing” does not include terrorism. The topic of “public
health” in the UK is dominated by the National Health Ser-
vice (NHS). “Welfare” is about entitlement to financial relief
such as disability allowance and unemployment cover.
In particular, figure 9 gives mention counts for these top-
ics in abuse-containing tweets posted in response to polit-
icans’ tweets in the month leading up to the 2017 general
election, and respectively, figure 11 does so for 2015. As
a comparison, figure 10 shows the topics mentioned in all
tweets in the same month for 2017, and figure 12 – those for
2015.
It is notable that in 2017 national security comes to the
fore in abuse-containing tweets, whilst only being the eighth
most prominent topic in the whole set of tweets. Similarly,
community and society is more frequent in abuse-containing
tweets than in tweets in general. In the month preceding the
2017 election, the UK witnessed its two deadliest terrorist
attacks of the decade so far, both attributed to ISIS. In 2015,
both for the abuse-containing tweets and the general set, the
economy is the most prominent topic. National security was
not an important topic in 2015. However, borders and immi-
gration appears more prominently in the abuse-containing
tweets. This may reflect the fact that EU membership was a
key topic in 2015, whereas by the time of the 2017 election,
the 2016 referendum had largely settled the question.
The absolute numbers above are not large, because abuse-
containing tweets often do not contain an explicit reference
to a topic. Therefore we also analysed the amount of abuse
that appeared in responses to tweets on particular topics. In
terms of number of abusive replies per topic mention, the
topic drawing the most abuse in 2017 was national secu-
rity, at a rate of 0.026 abusive replies per mention, signifi-
cantly higher than the mean of 0.014 (p<0.0001, chi-square
test with Yates correction). Other topics particularly draw-
ing abuse, considering only those with at least 50 abusive
replies, are employment (0.019), tax and revenue (0.019),
Scotland (0.019), the UK economy (0.018) and crime and
policing (0.018). Note that the topic replied to and the topic
replied about may be quite different. For example, a person
might reply to a tweet about the NHS with a contribution on
the subject of immigration.
Finally, we analyzed the topics mentioned across all
tweets by tweeters that sent abuse. We present results for the
2017 time period only. We collected up to 3,000 posts for
each of the 2,506 accounts that posted at least three abuse-
containing messages. Each of these accounts was then vec-
torialized on the basis of topic mentions, one dimension per
topic, and then clustered using k-means. Since the purpose is
exploratory, and the aim is to produce clusters that group the
accounts in a way that facilitates understanding, a k of 8 was
selected, since it makes for a readable result. The follow-
ing clusters emerged, described here in terms of their cosine
with each topic axis, giving an indicator of topic satellites
that might be used to profile those that send abuse:
• The Economy (409 accounts): Economy (0.48), Europe
(0.36), public health (0.33), tax (0.24), democracy (0.20)
• Europe and Trade (387 accounts): Europe (0.85), econ-
omy (0.20)
• The NHS (337 accounts): Public health (0.63), economy
(0.28), Europe (0.25), democracy (0.21), crime (0.21)
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• Borders (284 accounts): Europe (0.61), immigration
(0.35), community (0.29), national security (0.22), crime
(0.22)
• Crime (258 accounts): Crime (0.41), national security
(0.38), public health (0.26), economy (0.21)
• Changing Society (208 accounts): Community (0.63), im-
migration (0.36), national security (0.31), crime (0.26),
Europe (0.25)
• Scotland (145 accounts): Scotland (0.71), Europe (0.36),
economy (0.23)
• Schools (104 accounts): Schools (0.20)
The clusters have intuitively covered a range of view-
points that might indicate a strength of opinion. Only cluster
7, “schools”, is a weak cluster, and may simply have become
a catch-all for accounts with no strong profile. It shows that
despite national security accounting for the most abuse in
2017, in fact more of those sending abuse are concerned with
issues such as the economy, Europe and the national health
service. National security seems to be the purview of a vocal
minority of those sending abuse.
Discussion and Future Work
This work provides an empirical contribution to the current
debate around abuse of politicians online, challenging some
assumptions whilst providing a quantified corroboration for
others. In particular, we contribute a detailed investigation
into the behaviour and concerns of those who send abuse to
MPs and electoral candidates. Our main findings are item-
ized below.
• Abuse received correlates reliably with attention received.
However, within that, there is a tendency for the more
prominent politicians to receive proportionally less abuse,
and for those that engage with Twitter to receive more.
Male MPs and Conservatives were the target of more
abuse in the data studied.
• Abusive behaviour falls into different types. Users who
target their abuse at a small number of individuals show
more evidence of using throwaway accounts.
• The topics eliciting abusive tweets differ from those dis-
cussed by general users. In 2015, borders were a greater
topic of concern among those sending abuse, whereas in
2017, terrorism was.
• Abuse increased significantly between the 2015 and 2017
general elections.
Our finding regarding the gender of targeted politicians is
in keeping with the result for the general population reported
by Pew Internet Research.16 They note that whilst men re-
ceive more abuse, women are more likely to be subject to
stalking and sexual harrassment and are more likely to feel
upset by it. We did not separate out these types of abuse in
the current study, although it is planned for future work.
Regarding the finding that Conservatives receive more
harrassment, correctly contextualising this might involve
16http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/
contrasting the case where the Conservatives are not cur-
rently in power. Bartlett17 found the Conservatives were also
receiving a more negative response than Labour Party politi-
cians in February 2015, corroborating our findings. He fur-
ther notes, as do Theocharis et al (2016), that interactivity, in
the sense of sending fewer broadcast-style tweets and more
conversational tweets, tends to improve the way a politi-
cian is perceived. Note that we didn’t differentiate between
broadcast and interactive styles of tweeting in our work. It
would be interesting to contextualize our finding regarding
politicians with greater Twitter engagement drawing more
abuse by contrasting the two engagement styles.
The work presented here raises a number of questions
about how abuse is defined and measured, and what it says
about the perpetrator. Wulczyn el al (2017) note that less
than half of the abuse in Wikipedia talk pages comes from
anonymous users, which is in keeping with our finding that
abuse is not something that necessarily emerges from clearly
defined abberant individuals. It also depends on circum-
stances, and is part of a broader social picture. Further-
more, language needs to be contextualised to be meaning-
ful. A slight on someone’s intelligence can be hate speech
in one context and relatively harmless in another. Awan
and Zempi (2017) discuss the particular harm done by hate
speech. Quantitative work agglomerates a number of effects;
whilst our work found no strong evidence of increased abuse
towards BAME politicians, a tendency to show courtesy to
minorities generally could mask a strain of abuse that makes
them a particular target.
In future work, we will experiment with more specific
classification of hate speech such as that described by
Waseem and Hovy (2016). This would allow for further
work focusing specifically on the more severe issue of hate
and intimidation, a dimension vital for understanding the
real world impact of online abuse. It is possible that future
work might be able to quantify the impact that receiving
abuse has on a politician; however, such work would need to
be carefully designed, since it would need to control for the
natural rise and fall of a politician’s prominence, and with it
the amount of abuse they receive.
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